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Welfare states and environmental states: a comparative
analysis
Ian Gough*
CASE (Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion), London School of Economics and
Political Science, London, UK
A framework is presented for thinking about state intervention in developed
capitalist economies in two domains: social policy and environmental policy
(and, within that, climate-change policy). Five drivers of welfare state devel-
opment are identified, the ‘five Is’ of Industrialisation: Interests, Institutions,
Ideas/Ideologies, and International Influences. Research applying this frame-
work to the postwar development of welfare states in the OECD is sum-
marised, distinguishing two periods: up to 1980, and from 1980 to 2008.
How far this framework can contribute to understanding the rise and differ-
ential patterns of environmental governance and intervention across advanced
capitalist states since 1970 is explored, before briefly comparing and contrast-
ing the determinants of welfare states and environmental states, identifying
common drivers in both domains and regime-specific drivers in each. The
same framework is then applied to developments since 2008 and into the near
future, sketching two potential configurations and speculating on the condi-
tions for closer, more integrated ‘eco-welfare states’.
Keywords: welfare state; environmental state; climate mitigation policy;
social policy; comparative research
Introduction and conceptual framework
Here, I present a framework for thinking about state intervention in developed
capitalist economies in two domains: social policy and environmental policy (and,
within that, climate-change policy). I take up Meadowcroft’s (2005) suggestion that
the growth of welfare states provides interesting parallels and lessons for the more
recent emergence of the ‘environmental states’. He argues that both welfare states and
environmental states are faced with the task of mitigating negative market external-
ities. Just as the welfare state took on gradually increasing responsibilities for mitigat-
ing the social and human costs of the market economy, we have for about four decades
been witnessing a similar, halting development within the environmental realm.
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Since the welfare state predates the environmental state by at least one
generation, and on some measures by a century, what if any lessons can students
of environmental policymaking learn from welfare state scholarship? This scho-
larship comprises both historical and comparative research with a rich variety of
methodologies. Broadly speaking, it addresses both common historical trends
and drivers of the epochal shift in public responsibilities for the welfare of
national populations, and the immense variety we see in welfare systems across
the developed capitalist world (on which I focus here).
Early theories of welfare states emphasised the rise of industrial capitalism,
urbanisation, and population growth. The novel conditions and problems these
created fostered collective organisation initially on class interest lines. These
problem pressures and countermovements encountered different political contexts
and state legacies, which founded divergent institutional patterns of public welfare
regulation and provision. They also encountered distinct traditions and ideologies
which shaped public debates and actors. Over the past century, these factors have
intermeshed and reacted with international and global shifts, notably in the post–
Second World War period from predominantly closed to predominantly open
economies, which have reshaped welfare systems since around 1980.
Based on this cumulative research, I set out a framework of five drivers of
welfare states, the ‘five Is’ of Industrialisation: Interests, Institutions, Ideas and,
cutting across all of these, International Influences. ‘Drivers’ here refer to all
factors that together condition and mediate the development of the social and
environmental interventions of states. They include factors that lead to their
different configurations in different national contexts. Figure 1 sets out a
Figure 1. A simple model of drivers of welfare state development and differentiation.
Note: Gough (2008, p. 44).
Source: Author’s diagram, based on Easton 1965 and Hill 2003.
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simplified model of policymaking based on these five drivers. It also identifies
the social policy outputs, which can take a wide variety of forms, such as public
services, money transfers, taxation systems, regulations, and other interventions
in markets, households, and communities. These outputs are typically distin-
guished from final social outcomes, which encompass the welfare and well-being
situations of citizens and their distribution.
The five Is framework is not itself a theory but a heuristic which embraces all
the major theoretical currents in comparative welfare state research (see Gough
2008 for a fuller explanation). It evidently operates at a high level of abstraction
and cannot be applied to explain specific social policy outputs or welfare out-
comes. But it does enable us to explore, in Tilly’s (1984) words, ‘big structures
and large processes’ pertaining to modern welfare states. These include common
trends over time and systematic cross-national differences in such features as
social protection systems or health systems, and welfare outcomes, such as levels
of poverty, inequality, health, and security.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the complexity of this collective
scholarly enterprise. Baldwin (1990, pp. 36–37) notes that hardly a variable has
been neglected in explaining the emergence and diversity of modern welfare
states: ‘industrialisation, free trade, capitalism, modernisation, socialism, the
working class, civil servants, corporatism, reformers, Catholicism, war’ are
some of these. Castles (1998, p. 4) also warns about the difficulties in using
comparative research to help distinguish the salience of all these factors: ‘com-
plex policy processes are rarely likely to have singular determinants; there is no
guarantee that the factors influencing policy will be invariant over time; there is
no reason to suppose that different kinds of policy outputs will have the same
determinants; different policy outputs impact on different welfare outcomes in
complex ways’. Nonetheless, the corpus of his own work and that of others
demonstrates how seriously these problems are taken and how they can be
confronted (Castles 1998, Castles et al. 2010).
Having briefly reviewed the literature and findings on welfare states, I
proceed to explore what light, if any, this framework can throw on the develop-
ment and cross-national variations in the environmental activities of modern
states. Following the Introduction to this volume, an environmental state is
defined as ‘a state that possesses a significant set of institutions and practices
dedicated to the management of the environment and societal-environmental
interactions’ (Duit et al. 2016, p.??). At first sight, the differences between
state social and environmental policy would seem to be so wide that an exercise
such as this is doomed to failure. First, state welfare responsibilities have been
driven from the start mainly by domestic challenges and forces; whilst this is true
of some state environmental responsibilities, it is not true of global threats, such
as climate change, which are more evidently the product of global drivers and
discourses and multilateral policy processes (Meadowcroft 2005). Second, state
welfare interventions began with regulations of public health, hours of work, and
so forth but gradually developed in the direction of public financing and
Environmental Politics 3
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provisioning on a massive scale. At present, environmental interventions rely on
the regulatory state and, though moves towards trading, fiscal, and economic
innovations can now be seen, they remain relatively marginal compared with the
welfare state (Feindt, 2013). Third, several environmental challenges, notably
climate change, are policy domains of great uncertainty and complexity com-
pared with our understanding of threats to human welfare. Fourth, science and
scientists play a role in defining, measuring, modelling, and mitigating climate
change in a way without parallel in the social policy arena.
This discussion is organised in four subsequent sections plus a short conclu-
sion. The first section applies this framework to the development of welfare
states in the OECD since the Second World War, distinguishing two periods: up
to 1980, and from 1980 to 2008. The second section explores how far this
framework can help understand the emergence and differential patterns of envir-
onmental governance and intervention across advanced capitalist states, drawing
on the growing research into comparative environmental governance (Duit
2014). The third section compares and contrasts the respective determinants of
welfare and environmental state development and their cross-national variations.
The fourth section is more speculative. It utilises the same framework to explore
future drivers, sketches potential configurations of the two, and speculates on the
conditions for their further integration in some form of ‘eco-welfare’ state. The
final section concludes by advocating closer scholarly collaboration between
researchers into welfare states and environmental states.
Explaining welfare states
This part draws on the cumulative scholarship summarised in The Oxford
Handbook of the Welfare State (Castles et al. 2010).1 It is divided into two
periods, before and after 1980.
Drivers of welfare states up to 1980
Industrial capitalism and ‘problem pressures’
Industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century produced both new social chal-
lenges and new resources to meet them. It tore apart the social patterns of
minimal protection of the subsistence family, the village, and the guilds, and it
brought together large numbers of men and women outside traditional tutelage,
in factories and new cities, creating and incessantly increasing the challenges of
social disintegration and of social protest. At the same time, industrial economic
growth, and the new medical and scientific knowledge associated with it in
European modernity, provided novel resources to deal with poverty, disease,
and premature death. Thus, the common findings of comparative research
emphasise the importance of industrialisation (and concomitant ‘de-ruralisation’),
economic growth, and the demographic transition in initiating state social
4 I. Gough
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responsibilities in the nineteenth century and in driving their expansion in the
twentieth century.
Interests
In the new societies of industrial capitalism, two powerful, opposite interests con-
verged in generating public social policies. There was the interest of the industrial
proletariat in at least some minimally adequate housing and social amenities in the
new industrial cities, and in acquiring some kind of security in cases of injury,
sickness, unemployment, and old age. That interest was soon organised, in trade
unions, mutual aid societies, and labour-based parties. On the other side of the fence,
there was the interest of political elites in social order and the quality of the
population, more often out of concern for soldier material than for productivity.
The French revolutions of 1789, 1830, 1848, and 1870–1871 meant that elite interest
in making efforts to prevent disorder and rebellion was quite rational.
In the post–Second World War period of democratic consolidation, this model
of class-based interests could explain both welfare expansion and cross-national
variations. The ‘power resources theory’ postulated that the distribution of eco-
nomic and political resources across the main social classes, and notably between
business and labour, would determine the extent, range, and redistributive effects of
economic and social policies (Korpi 1983). It could begin to explain, for example,
the contrasts between the Scandinavian and American welfare states.
Institutions
Institutions turned challenges, resources, and interests into consolidated, self-
reproducing realities. The welfare state is part of a longer-term process by which
power is accumulated in nation states by building state capacities, collecting
taxes, and constructing citizenship. The European welfare state emerged out of
the coalescence of the bureaucratic Rechtsstaat (state of public law) and insur-
ance, prompted by the fear of workers’ rebellion and with a view to the
strengthening and development of nation states. This happened in Bismarck’s
Germany, setting an example for the rest Europe. In other countries, statism and
social rights (France), corporatism (Italy), and social liberalism (the UK) pro-
vided the initial impetus. In the period after the Second World War, different
national origins and institutions consolidated into the ‘three worlds of welfare
capitalism’ conceived by Esping-Andersen (1990). His theory brought together
socio-economic development, interests, and institutions into three distinct pat-
terns of welfare regimes, each evincing considerable path dependency – the
worlds of liberalism in the Anglosphere, social democracy centred in the
Nordic countries, and a third world variously labelled conservatism or corporat-
ism in Western continental Europe (with some distinguishing here a fourth,
Mediterranean world comprising Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece).
Environmental Politics 5
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Ideas
In addition, ideas influence public policies as human practices (putting to one
side whether they are considered major autonomous forces or as derivations from
large social processes and the interests generated by these). Formative ideas
behind the emergence and development of European welfare states included
the European rights tradition, the civic republican tradition modernised into
two major branches – British social liberalism and French post-revolutionary
republicanism, plus social democracy and social Catholicism (Gough and
Therborn 2010). These too contributed to the variety of welfare regimes within
Western Europe. Later inputs have come from Keynesian economics and post-
Keynesian economic theories of ‘human capital’ and ‘productive social policy’,
and more recently still from neo-liberal and Hayekian schools of thought.
International influences
Finally, the international environment must be considered. The outcome of the
Second World War popularised the ‘welfare state’ idea, of British wartime coinage,
and the Beveridge report became for a short while a new European model. In
different ways, the European social contract had been set. For fear of Communism,
US leaders refrained from trying to impose their own model of capitalism on
Western Europe; rather, they were supportive of attempts at European integration
and at sustaining Western European institutions. Postwar welfare states flourished
in a supportive international environment of a West-dominated capitalism, with
little low-wage competition and nationally governed currencies and capital flows.
What clinched the rise of especially the European welfare state to its present
size was the postwar boom. Welfare systems expanded remarkably as a share of
GDP and much more in absolute terms: by 1980, public social expenditure
(excluding education) reached on average 17.5% of GDP in the OECD, highest
in ‘continental’ and Nordic Europe (22–23%) and lowest in southern Europe
(13.5%) and the English-speaking world (15%) (Obinger and Wagschal 2010).
Much research confirmed the independent significance of the first three factors in
explaining these and other trends and differences across welfare states in the
trente glorieuses: industrial and concomitant economic and demographic shifts,
the mobilisation and power of different interests, and the institutional structures
of nations (e.g. Huber et al. 1993). By the 1970s, the welfare state had become
an established feature of the polity, economy, and society of the developed world.
Drivers of welfare states 1980–2008
The 1970s generated increasing strains within capitalist economies. Though
these were theorised in very different ways, there was background agreement
that rising real wages and rising welfare provision (the ‘social wage’) was
reducing the share and rate of profit and thus the dynamism and growth rates
6 I. Gough
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of Western capitalism. Social policy was argued by the new right to be increas-
ingly misaligned with the economy. The two oil crises of the 1970s further
impaired growth and thus tax revenues. The ‘fiscal crisis of the welfare state’ was
discussed, and was met by decisive countermovement, notably in the USA and
the UK under Reagan and Thatcher. Keynesian capitalism was succeeded by
neo-liberal capitalism, though to varying degrees in different economies. Again,
we can consider the roles of the five factors in bringing this about and their
implications for social policy.
Post-industrialism and other socio-economic shifts
Industrialisation peaked in the late 1970s in the OECD world, as measured by the
share of manufacturing in national output, the scale of the industrial workforce,
and trade union membership. Subsequently, the ‘service economy’ grew and
grew, and growth rates fell. With lower productivity growth, this led to new
distributional trade-offs between three core policy objectives: wage equality,
expansion of employment, and budgetary restraint. The ‘trilemma’ of the service
economy argues that while it is possible to pursue two of these goals, it has so far
proved impossible simultaneously to achieve all three (Iversen and Wren 1998).
At the same time, profound social changes altered the nature of families and
fostered new demands on public services. To population ageing was added a
sharp decline in fertility rates in many countries, which further raised the share of
the ‘dependent’ population. Thus, economic resources grew more slowly while
demands on the welfare state escalated. At the same time, inequality trended
steeply upwards during this period, exerting new pressures on the postwar social
settlement.
International influences: ‘globalisation’
At the international level, economies were being opened up with globalisation,
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of international monetary
management. Capital became more mobile, and constraints on this mobility were
rapidly removed, initially by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, and
capital flows as a share of GDP escalated after 1983. This was augmented by
the growing influence of the IMF and World Bank in setting international
economic policy. Finally, the collapse of communism and the Soviet Bloc in
1989–1990 signalled not only the triumph of capitalism over state socialism, but
also the triumph of deregulated capitalism over any substantial public economic
steering.
Interests
At the same time, the balance of class interests reversed: the power of capital
increased while the membership and power of trade unions decreased, especially in
Environmental Politics 7
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the liberal regime. Globalisation enhanced Lindblom’s (1977) privileged position of
business, the power of ‘exit’ rather than voice. The structural power of capital
increased the ability of business and finance to influence government policy,
including social policy, without having to apply direct pressure on governments
through its agents (Gough 2000, ch. 4). The spate of deregulation augmented this
power. In turn, this has boosted the ‘agency power’ of corporate and finance capital
and its ability to set important limits on state intervention.
Institutions
At the institutional level, the features of ‘organised capitalism’, such as neo-
corporatist forms of wage bargaining and societal bargaining, were weaken-
ing. Starting in the Anglosphere, ‘disorganised capitalism’ gained ground
(Lash and Urry 1987). Business, and notably the financial sectors, began to
exert more influence over economic and social policymaking, heralding the
rise of what Hacker and Pierson (2010) label ‘winner takes all politics’. The
balance between voters and corporate interest groups tilted in favour of the
latter.
Ideas
Neo-liberal ideas became more dominant within economic and social policy-
making, initially within the Anglosphere, but increasingly influential across
Europe. Two decades of unrelenting intellectual attack on the idea of public
welfare challenged the faith in big government. The state was to be rolled back;
instead, markets were insistently advocated or, where these were not possible,
‘quasi-markets’. Though welfare states continued to be publicly financed, grow-
ing areas of social policy provision were contracted out to private providers, with
ambiguous results in terms of cost control and service quality.
These three decades can be summarised in two ways: common trends over
time, and systemic differences between ‘welfare regimes’. First, welfare spend-
ing continued to rise across the OECD, though much more slowly than in the
previous three decades. Total social spending in the OECD increased by five
percentage points of GDP in the quarter-century after 1980, but much of this was
driven by big expansions in southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, and
Greece) that were catching up after democratisation in the 1970s. The rate of
growth in the Anglophone countries was around three percentage points. This
indicates substantial retrenchment in some countries, when slower economic
growth, ageing populations, new social needs, and slower productivity growth
in services is taken into account. In no country did the share of social expenditure
in GDP decline, but this was the period in which Flora’s (1986) prediction of
‘growth to limits’ was broadly confirmed: the welfare state up to 2008 was
consolidated but constrained. Welfare outcomes improved across a range of
8 I. Gough
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variables, notably health and incomes, but this was offset by ballooning
inequality.
However, research also tends to show that, if anything, differences between
welfare regimes continued to diverge in this period (Goodin et al. 1999, Hay and
Wincott 2012). For example, there is no evidence that generous Nordic welfare
states have been disadvantaged in international competition; rather, the contrary.
‘Cameron’s law’ (Cameron 1978) – that more open economies almost always
have more extensive welfare states – was confirmed (Scharpf and Schmidt
2000a, 2000b). This was also the time when ideas of ‘productive welfare states’
and ‘social investment’ gained ground, led by the example of the Nordic
countries, in particular Sweden (Hemerijck 2012).
Thus, Swank’s (2002) comparative research demonstrates that the rise in
international capital mobility has not contributed in a systematic way to the
retrenchment of developed welfare states or the tax state. Domestic institu-
tional features have been important in mediating these global factors. Pro-
welfare interests are favoured by inclusive electoral systems, social corporatist
interest representation, centralised political authority, and universal and social
insurance–based programmes. On the other hand, rollbacks in social protection
are more likely in countries with majoritarian electoral systems, pluralist
interest representation and policymaking, decentralised policymaking author-
ity, and liberal, targeted social programmes. Institutional features of the polity
and welfare state determined the extent to which the economic and political
pressures associated with globalisation are translated into cost containment,
re-commodification or recalibration of social protection and the welfare state
(Pierson 2001).
Exploring environmental states
Can the above framework throw light on the much more recent emergence of the
‘environmental state’? According to Meadowcroft (2012), this state developed in
two phases. The first, starting around 1970, witnessed an independent realm of
law, policies, administration, and regulation to clean up the environment. The
second, emerging in the late 1980s, strengthened linkages between this apparatus
and broader state concerns with the economy, security, and welfare, often under
the banner of promoting ‘sustainable development’. These two phases exhibit a
weak correspondence with the two stages of postwar welfare development, so I
will not distinguish the pre- and post-1980 periods here. This section explores a
variety of hypotheses concerning the impact of the five Is on the environmental
state, concentrating wherever possible on climate-change mitigation pro-
grammes. In lieu of a systematic survey of the research literature, it also cites
some relevant research under each heading.
Environmental Politics 9
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Industrial capitalism and structural ‘problem pressures’
The role of industrial capitalism in escalating environmental problems and later
crises is evident. The pursuit of profit coupled with industrial technology pushes
the global economy towards and in some cases beyond environmental limits. To
date, the entire global expansion of capitalist economic throughput has rested on
cheap energy in the form of first coal and then oil (and now gas): industrial
capitalism has been ‘carboniferous capitalism’. Though the productivity of
natural resources can be enhanced using technology, there are limits to the
substitutability of natural and man-made capital. At many points, a relentless
accumulation machine runs up against these natural limits (Rockström et al.
2009). Thus, rising levels of socio-economic development and incomes can serve
as relevant indicators of structural ‘problem pressures’ in the environmental field.
The ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ is supported by some evidence that higher
levels of economic development result in lower levels of, for example, air and
water pollution.2 However, there is general agreement that it does not apply to
resource use including energy and to CO2 and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
which tend to rise monotonically with GDP.
Interests
The influence of class interests, so central to welfare state research, is virtually
absent in the environmental field. Rather, there is evidence that environmental
concerns are more prevalent among more educated and affluent groups. Thus,
mounting climate-change problems foster new interests to pressure for collec-
tive, and increasingly governmental, responses. There has been an ‘efflores-
cence of non-state activism’: protest groups, countercultural movements, green
parties, and so on spring up to fight against the exploitation of the earth.
These new environmental social movements impact on the role of civil society
and the nature of governmentality (Dryzek et al. 2003, Lipschutz and Corina
2011).
However, business interests have played a more explicit role in shaping
environmental policy, compared with social policy. Rationalists might predict
that states reliant on fossil fuels would be climate ‘laggards’, and indeed there is
a remarkably close link between countries with large carbon reserves and
opposition to global climate agreements, and vice versa (Berners-Lee and
Clark 2013). Such reserves generate large economic rents and powerful consti-
tuencies wanting to defer climate action as long as possible. On the other hand,
some sectors of business see profitable opportunities in Green products and
processes. Countries far advanced towards service economies with large import
surpluses are also likely to witness less business opposition to climate-mitigation
measures.3 ‘Brown capitalist’ interests are now opposed by a growing force
advocating Green growth and ‘Green capitalism’, and the balance between the
two will impact on national climate policies (Falkner 2008).
10 I. Gough
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Institutions
A wide range of institutional factors can be hypothesised as drivers of the
environmental state. First, the formal rules of representative democracy, such
as presidential versus parliamentary, or federal versus unitary systems, can be
important. Second, the degree of devolution of powers might be significant given
the potential importance of local capacities in decarbonising economies (Duit
2014). A third is the organisation of economic interests and their links with
government (Scruggs 2003, Fiorino 2011). These include the representation of
business and financial interests at a national level and their incorporation in state
agencies, and the related contrast between pluralist modes of interest representa-
tion and negotiated forms of coordination. This last promises a link with different
‘varieties of capitalism’. Finally, the environmental state has necessarily been
built on top of preceding welfare states. Thus, the prior welfare regimes may be
expected to influence environmental policies. They may also affect the extent to
which nations can devise and implement integrated ‘eco-social’ programmes,
rather than ‘layering’ environmental policies on top of social policies with no
discernible policy integration (discussed below).
Ideas
The ethics of environmentalism and Green politics challenge all dominant
ideologies of the postwar period that rely on a productionist economic frame-
work and an assumption of continuing economic growth (Dryzek et al. 2003,
Eckersley 2004). In particular, they sit uneasily alongside today’s dominant
ideology of neo-liberalism. Bernstein (2001) identifies a ‘compromise of liberal
environmentalism’, whereby environmental governance since the 1970s has been
progressively predicated on the promotion and maintenance of a liberal eco-
nomic order. Green and climate-change agendas have largely risen in the era of
dominant neo-liberal ideas, a denigration of state capacities and hostility to
public initiatives. In the case of climate change, there is also an empirical link
between neo-liberal beliefs and denial of the science, which could explain the
relative strength of opposition to climate policy in the Anglosphere (Painter and
Ashe 2012).
In countries where social democratic or corporatist ideas continue to have
purchase, the paradigm of ‘ecological modernisation’ and now ‘Green growth’
can act as a bridge between sustainable and productionist perspectives. This
relates to the ‘issue framing’ of climate-change concerns. In some nations, such
as the USA and Australia, climate change has become a crucial ‘ideological
marker’ generating strongly polarised positions, in contrast to Northern Europe.
These discourses can affect the balance of interests discussed above, but are in
turn significantly produced by them (Christoff and Eckersley 2011). It seems
reasonable to conclude that the degree of hegemony of neo-liberal ideas in a
country will constrain the scope and depth of environmental states.
Environmental Politics 11
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International influences
The international dimension is integral to most environmental issues and is
absolutely central to climate change. This is a major contrast with welfare states,
which have been predominantly driven by domestic factors, with discussion of
policy learning and diffusion only in recent years. The role of policy diffusion
and the importance of nations’ international political and economic linkages is
much discussed in explaining the speed and extent of environmental policy
innovation (Knill et al. 2014). Fears that more globalisation and regulatory
competition might lead to a deregulatory race are mostly unfounded (Duit
2014). Indeed, it can be argued that ‘globalisation’ has aided the spread of
environmental states, in contrast to its absent or negative impact on contempor-
ary welfare states.4
There is a growing body of research on the respective importance of these
five factors in explaining the uneven emergence of environmental states. These
include Scruggs (2003), Duit (2008), Liefferink et al. (2009), Fiorino (2011), and
a range of authors contributing to Duit (2014), including Knill et al., Jahn, and
Sommerer. These differ in numerous respects: the scope of environmental reg-
ulation assessed, the countries and time periods covered, the conceptual frame-
works, and methodologies. Studies of specific climate policies and achievements
are scarcer, but they include Christoff and Eckersley (2011), Fankhauser et al.
(2014), and some of the findings in Duit (2014). To survey this research is
beyond the scope of this discussion, but is covered elsewhere in this volume.
However, I draw on some of these findings in the comparison of welfare states
and environmental states that follows.
Comparing welfare states and environmental states
This section draws together these hypotheses and findings, and explores con-
trasts and commonalities in the drivers of welfare states and environmental
states. Table 1 provides a summary.
Industrialisation and problem pressures
Globalisation, financialisation, de-industrialisation, and ongoing but slower
growth have been critical background drivers in both domains but in contra-
dictory ways. Welfare states have been premised on growth states, and the slide
in growth rates during and after the 1970s contributed to various forms of
retrenchment over the next three decades. On the other hand, continuing growth
of production and – increasingly more detached – personal consumption in the
OECD precipitated new environmental problem pressures.
Other problem pressures have impacted differently on different welfare states
and environmental states. One factor that heightens regime differences has been
the presence of fossil-fuel reserves in most Anglosphere countries compared with
12 I. Gough
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the EU (Berners-Lee and Clark 2013). Yet, vulnerability to climate change
appears to be a poor predictor: Australia is vulnerable on many fronts but is a
‘laggard’ country (Christoff and Eckersley 2011).
Interests
Working-class interests have been weakened in the social domain, and they
feature little in the environment domain. The impact of their replacement by
environmental and Green mobilisations has yet to be evaluated. Business interests
have a renewed salience in both domains but in different ways. Welfare states
have been constrained by the growing structural power of business and finance
alongside globalisation. However, the scope and impact of environmental states is
affected by the configuration and power of ‘green’ and ‘brown’ business interests.
Institutions
The impact of political and economic institutions has been more similar across
the two domains. Factors favouring both welfare and environmental states appear
to be both political (proportional representation with substantial Green parties vs.
first-past-the-post electoral systems, etc.) and economic (long-term vs. short-term
financial structures, corporatist vs. liberalised corporate and labour market insti-
tutions). Such institutional configurations supported earlier conclusions that
coordinated market economies with social democratic welfare states tend to see
Table 1. Major drivers of welfare states and environmental states.
The five Is Welfare state (post 1980) Environmental state
Industrialisation and
structural ‘problem
pressures’
Growth plus
de-industrialisation
Consumption growth plus
carboniferous capitalism
Demographic and social shifts Environmental vulnerability
Rising inequality
Interests Balance of class
interests
Balance of ‘brown’ and ‘green’
business interests
Rising structural power of
capital
Green movements and their
political expression
Institutions Pluralist versus corporatist
interest representation
Pluralist versus corporatist
interest representation
Centralised administrative state Devolved powers
Prior welfare regime Prior welfare regime
Ideas Neo-liberalism versus social
citizenship
Neo-liberalism versus ‘Green
growth’
‘Social investment’ paradigm ‘Green growth’ paradigm
Degree of political polarisation Degree of political polarisation
International
influences
Economic globalisation and its
management
International linkages
Policy diffusion
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economic and ecological values as mutually reinforcing (Dryzek et al. 2003,
Meadowcroft 2005, Gough et al. 2008). On the other hand, the recognition that
localities have a critical role to play in environmental innovation sits uneasily
alongside the role of centralised administrative agencies in welfare states.
Ideas
The ideational background of welfare and environmental states has been cru-
cially affected by their timing: welfare states flourished in the trente glorieuses of
Keynesianism and social reformism. This period also spawned the early years of
Green awareness, but environmental states have developed in the neo-liberal
decades, which have denigrated and sought to unwind state capacities and
regulation. This has also undermined and reversed some features of welfarism
in different countries, but the embeddedness and path dependencies established
earlier protected much of their legacy at least in this period. Together, these have
enabled leading EU countries – and the EU itself – to advance an alternative
strategy of accumulation, based on aggressive carbon constraints, Green technol-
ogy, and Green growth, coupled with a weakly emerging social investment
strategy. The presence or absence of polarising political discourse is relevant in
both domains – ‘anti-welfare’ versus ‘social investment’; climate denial versus
Green growth – and explains persistent differences, notably between the USA
and all other advanced economies.
International influences
International influences have had very different impacts on welfare states and
environmental states. Globalisation and economic openness notably since 1980
have acted as a constraint on welfare states. In the environmental domain, it has
worked both ways. On the one hand, it has accelerated economic development
that is spreading environmental dislocation to new zones of the world. On the
other hand, international linkages appear to facilitate the adoption of environ-
mental and climate-change policies (including after a lag in these new zones).
Climate-change policies too have been significantly driven by cross-national
policy learning and diffusion, particularly evident within the EU over this period.
A broad-brush conclusion might be the following. Common drivers of
changes in welfare states and environmental states include globalisation and
internationalisation, the rising power of capital and business over other classes,
and the continuing dominance of neo-liberal ideas. Neo-liberalism is a block to
progress in both domains, but the other factors operate in different ways in the
two domains. International economic and political linkages favour the environ-
mental state but weaken the welfare state. Business power promotes inequality
and weakens welfare and, in many countries, blocks climate-mitigation pro-
grammes; but its impact on the environmental state depends on the balance of
carboniferous and Green business interests.
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On the other hand, institutions and ideas continue to explain cross-national
differences in both domains. Deep institutional differences persist across the
advanced capitalist countries reflecting welfare regimes and varieties of capital-
ism. These, interacting with different power and ideational constellations, con-
tinue to drive different policy outputs in both spheres of state activity with
contrasting social and environmental outcomes. Broadly speaking, these demar-
cate the Anglosphere from the EU.
The future of welfare and environmental states
This section uses the same framework to speculate on likely drivers of both
domains of state activity in the near future. It then adumbrates two scenarios with
different configurations of economic, environmental, and social policies: a busi-
ness-as-usual scenario with weaker social and climate-change policies ‘layered’
on top of market-oriented economic strategy; and stronger climate mitigation
efforts integrated with a social investment strategy. The future is radically
uncertain, and this is no exercise in prediction but one of speculation about
potential future relations between our two domains.
Future drivers of welfare and environmental interventions
The 2008 financial crisis
I begin with an overriding structural factor with implications for both welfare and
environmental states – the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. As Marx and
Schumpeter recognised, capitalism proceeds via sporadic but spectacular crises.
The stock-market crash and great depression in the interwar period posed dra-
matic new challenges for social welfare, met in quite different ways in
Roosevelt’s USA, Hansson’s Sweden, and Hitler’s Germany. By any standards,
the 2008 crisis and its ensuing waves of contagion constituted an epochal global
economic crisis. Rapid state bailouts of banks and the financial sector avoided
the worst-case scenario, but drove up public debt and triggered a major fiscal
crisis, notably in the UK and Eurozone. This was followed immediately by a
major and prolonged recession in much of the Western capitalist world. The
crisis was essentially exogenous to both welfare states and environmental states,
caused by the unleashing of unregulated global financial markets centred in
London and New York, but its impacts on both have been significant.
Slower growth
One likely implication is that secular growth rates in Western countries will not
return to pre-crisis levels, for several reasons. First, the enormous personal debt
overhang across the OECD world will restrain consumer spending. Second, the
shift to low-productivity services will continue though at a reduced rate. Third, in
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all countries, ageing populations and falling fertility rates will ceteris paribus slow
down or even decrease the labour force and require higher fiscal expenditures
(Glennerster 2010). It would thus seem prudent to plan now for a future of growth
rates slower than over the previous three decades, which in turn exhibited lower
growth rates than the decades after the Second World War (Cecchetti et al. 2010,
Demailly et al. 2013). At the same time, all recovery paths would seem to require
an increase in the share of investment in GDP, which ceteris paribus further
reduces the future growth rate of consumption. Sharing out this smaller total
between private and public consumption becomes politically more fraught. On
the other side, slower growth rates will slow down emissions, but this may under-
mine future-oriented mitigation efforts and thus the scope of environmental states.
This combination of crisis aftermath, continuing global expansion, and slow-
down in the West will not apply equally across countries (Hay and Wincott
2012). Countries rich in resources and raw material, notably Australia, Canada,
and the USA, may continue to benefit from some of these trends, while the EU
may be a notable loser (Demailly et al. 2013). However, this would depend on
the success or failure of the current campaign to keep unburnable oil, gas, and
coal in the ground (Berners-Lee and Clark 2013, Ranger and Ward 2013). The
success or otherwise of the campaign to disinvest from fossil fuels would have
important implications for the division of interests within the OECD.
Ideas
The crisis of deregulated financial capitalism might have been expected to deal a
fatal blow to the dominant economic paradigm of the previous three decades, and at
the least to have brought about a critical realignment of producer groups
(Gourevitch 1986). This has not (yet) happened; the reality is, in Crouch’s (2011)
words, ‘the strange non-death of neo-liberalism’. The brief period of successful
state activism to bail out the financial system brought about a surge in state debt and
a fiscal crisis for public sectors in the West, for which the hegemonic prescription
was ‘austerity’. This partly reflects the absence of any alternative economic strat-
egy, Keynesian or otherwise, to address fully the post-crisis state of the economy.
The cross-national contagion of problems has led to a contagion of solutions!
Two major discourses relevant to this article continue to contest this hege-
mony. In social policy, the social-investment approach maintains a foothold in
Europe, for example the EU Social Investment Package of 2013 (Esping-
Andersen 2002, Hemerijck 2012). In environmental policy, the ecological mod-
ernisation discourse remains important, again in Europe (Wurzel 2012). The
prospects that either may challenge neo-liberalism are discussed below.
Interests
Neo-liberalism serves the interests of powerful capitalist agents, and in turn
strengthens their power. Crouch argues that it serves the interests of giant
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corporations, which are ‘more potent than states or markets’. This power is based
on both structure (their ability to engage in ‘regime shopping’ in a globalising
world economy) and agency (their capacity and willingness to spend vast
amounts on lobbying and political funding). For other scholars, it is the financial
sector that drives neo-liberal policies and benefits most from them (Glyn 2006,
Duménil and Dominique 2011). As industry declines and is outsourced from the
West, most notably in the UK, capitalism becomes financialised with numerous
consequences, including widening inequality. On either count, the end result is
the ‘capture’ of governments by corporations, a process begun in the USA. Yet,
the crisis perversely strengthens financial capital: state dependence on borrowing
and debt management increases, hence its structural position became more
critical to national economic survival (Woll 2014).
Institutions
Thus, governments, starting with the American and British, become more behol-
den to these private and sectional interests and ideas. Indeed, governments and
capital become more entwined, and the ability of democracy to temper this is
eroded as ‘winner-takes-all’ politics takes over (Streeck 2014). Within European
states and the EU, the institutional configuration of finance and business minis-
tries will play an important role in fostering or blocking alternative social/Green
investment programmes.
Current policy responses
The legacy of the past three decades as well as the impact of the crisis means that
welfare states are operating in contexts of macro-economic instability, fiscal
restraint, and growing inequality. Moreover, the accumulation of policy legacies
undermines the capacities of welfare states to address new issues (Streeck and
Mertens 2011). In the Eurozone, banking and fiscal crises have forced incre-
mental policymaking aside in favour of radical, fast, macro-economic decision-
making (Kvist 2013).
In terms of policy outputs, one social policy option is now dominant –
austerity. In order to get borrowing and debt down, government spending has
been cut and taxes raised, though the ratio is heavily biased towards cuts (in the
UK by 5:1). This has exacerbated the existing drop in real incomes and con-
sumption spending to worsen the economic downturn and, in many countries,
deficit levels and public debt. In the Eurozone, a new Fiscal Compact, incorpo-
rated into the 2013 Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance, commits
governments to a cap of 0.5% on the ‘structural deficit’ with enforcement by the
European Court of Justice. Outside the Eurozone, the reaction of the UK
government stands out. The Conservative-led coalition government chose to
use the opportunity to impose large cutbacks in social spending which targeted
to bring down the share of public spending to US levels by 2016. Here, the crisis
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has been used to refashion the postwar welfare settlement and bring it closer to
‘Team America’ (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker 2011, Taylor-Gooby 2013).
Climate-change policy is relatively protected from such fiscal pressures,
since the dominant form of interventions is regulatory and market-based.
However, there is some evidence that the current recession is downgrading
government commitments. Industries reliant on fossil fuels and high energy
use, facing rising costs and slower growth as mitigation policies begin to bite,
are fighting back. The success of such policies depends on the strength and
mobilisation of Green business interests and associated trade unions and social
movements – but also on the success of neo-liberal ideological currents
opposed to a strengthened environmental state and even to the whole idea of
global warming.
The future of welfare and environmental states: linkage or layering?
Looking further ahead, a variety of policy responses by nation states can be
envisaged as the constraints of both rising commodity prices and climate-change
impinge. There will be no single path, or one-size-fits-all policy response,
leading to a lower-carbon world. The above analysis of slower growth suggests
a more constrained world, against which the sole weapon is rapid, indeed
revolutionary, technological change. The extent to which a ‘fifth industrial
revolution’ (Stern 2015) can bring very rapid decarbonisation and a halt to the
release of GHGs is much disputed, and is beyond the scope of this discussion.
Instead, I consider two scenarios for the OECD world – business as usual (BAU)
and radical decarbonisation – and their associated patterns of linkage between
environmental and social policies.
The first, BAU scenario may suit countries shielded by external and internal
resources from excessive climate challenges in the medium term, such as
Australia and Canada (although this would be predicated on the failure of the
‘stranded assets’ campaign to devalue oil, gas, and coal reserves). In this benign
scenario, policy pressures could continue to be developed incrementally in both
the environmental and social domains. Given the earlier weight and preponder-
ance of social policies, environmental policies would be ‘layered’ on top of
these, a process whereby new policies are created without the elimination of old
ones (cf. Feindt and Flynn 2009). Limited price mechanisms would be the
favoured measure to direct energy development, but these will create losers,
notably low-income families and people with low educational skills and weak
labour market networks. If there is any pressure to rectify this, it will take the
classic liberal form of compensating losers (Gough 2013a). This ‘climate safety-
net’ approach entails a market liberal view of both climate mitigation and social
policy.
An alternative scenario is one where stringent emissions reduction pro-
grammes are pursued and are more closely integrated with radical social
policies. Recent modelling of such a scenario shows more immediate losses
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to growth rates over the next two decades, as carbon pricing drives up produc-
tion costs and slows down increases in purchasing power, but subsequently
leads to higher growth rates in the following decades due to the move to an
energy pathway less constrained by peak oil (Demailly et al. 2013).
Furthermore, lifestyles and behaviours gradually shift in a low-carbon direction
due to complementary investment in transport and urban forms and accompa-
nying regulatory standards. This is predicted to limit ‘rebound effects’ in
private consumption more effectively, entailing a complementary role for social
and environmental policy.
This scenario would entail ‘redrawing the economic borders of the state’ and
placing sustainability at its heart. Just as the post–Second World War social
settlement added distributive and social issues to the economic and security
functions of the state, so now would sustainability functions be added and
addressed. Such a ‘new social settlement’ would require radical change and
would challenge two vital features of the current social settlement through the
West: consumption and work.
An eco-social consumption policy would need to prioritise collective
investment and consumption over private commodities; foster local, commu-
nity-based consumption; identify high-carbon luxury consumption; improve
diets to benefit both health and the environment; and move welfare interven-
tions ‘upstream’ to prevent rather than ameliorate social problems. An eco-
social work policy would gradually reduce paid work time, foster alternative
employment contracts, develop ‘co-production’ in service delivery, and encou-
rage low-carbon leisure activities. Together, the now very unequal distribution
of personal consumption would need to be addressed, via socialised consump-
tion, taxation, public transfers, and ‘pre-distribution’ measures such as mini-
mum wages, maximum rewards, and trade-union rights. These are radical
shifts that would challenge dominant interests and ideas, for example ‘con-
sumer sovereignty’ and unquestioned economic growth. They would need to
be accomplished in the face of accumulated policy legacies of existing welfare
and environmental states.5 A necessary precondition would be extensive con-
sensual policymaking involving key constituencies of interest to set the frame-
works for markets (Wurzel 2012).
These two models of the future relation of welfare states and environmental
states cannot straightforwardly be identified with any country or cluster of
countries in the OECD world. Yet, there is no doubt that these futures build on
the existing models of varieties of capitalism and welfare regimes, and that the
division between the Anglosphere and Europe is strongly represented here.
Much may change. All one can say is that it remains most likely that more
integrated eco-welfare states will be fostered in Europe. But against this is the
narrative-changing effect of the 2008 crisis. If the Eurozone fails and the EU
weakens dramatically, the best hope for an integrated eco-welfare state will
disappear.
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Conclusion
I have here set out a framework for understanding and comparing the emergence
and trajectory of welfare states with the more recent development of ‘environ-
mental states’, concentrating in the main on the single issue/challenge of climate
change. Common drivers include globalisation and internationalisation, the rising
power of capital and business over other classes, and the continuing dominance
of neo-liberal ideas. International economic and political linkages favour the
environmental state but weaken the welfare state. Business power promotes
inequality and weakens welfare, and in many countries blocks climate mitigation
programmes; but its impact on the environmental state depends on the balance of
carboniferous and Green business interests. Yet, deep institutional differences
also persist within the advanced capitalist world, reflecting welfare regimes and
varieties of capitalism. These, interacting with different power and ideational
constellations, continue to drive different policy outputs in both spheres of state
activity with contrasting social and environmental outcomes. Broadly speaking,
these clusters demarcate the Anglosphere from the EU, with the UK in a contra-
dictory middle position.
In the final section, I apply the same framework to developments since
2008 and briefly speculate about longer-term linkages and de-linkages
between states’ welfare and environmental interventions. The aftermath of
the financial and economic crisis is damaging both sets of state functions,
but the welfare state more due to fiscal crisis pressures, whereas international
drivers may sustain states’ environmental and climate interventions. The goal
of closer integration in an ‘eco-welfare state’ is challenging and would seem
to require both more extensive and more consensual policymaking, which
theory and history suggests is only realisable in more coordinated forms of
capitalism. However, if the persistence of neo-liberalism and austerity beto-
kens the end of ‘varieties of capitalism’, the scope for an ‘eco-welfare state’ is
narrowed, at least in the West.
Finally, I hope to have demonstrated the benefits of cross-national analysis of
state interventions in different domains and the need for more collaborative work
between students of welfare and environmental policies. The accumulated scho-
larship on welfare states offers lessons for environmental researchers, but there
are lessons to be learned in both directions. There is a need for less silo-bound
and more integrated research into modern state policymaking.
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Notes
1. In particular, it draws on: the editors’ Introduction, ‘Intellectual roots’ by Pierson
and Leimgruber; ‘The emergence of the welfare state’ by Kuhnle and Sander;
‘Post-war welfare state development’ by Nullmeier and Kaufmann; ‘Social expen-
diture and revenues’ by Obinger and Wagschal; ‘The social rights of citizenship’
by Stephens; ‘Welfare retrenchment’ by Levy; ‘Models of the welfare state’ by
Arts and Gelissen; and ‘The global future of welfare states’ by Therborn and
myself.
2. Though even in these fields much can be explained by the offshoring of industrial
production under the guise of globalisation.
3. The extent that countries are net importers of manufactured goods and thus ‘expor-
ters’ of emissions varies widely: the UK ‘outsources’ one quarter of its emissions,
which provides an important leeway in meeting its Kyoto targets, whereas Germany
and Japan are roughly in balance. This could contribute to the UK’s ‘leadership’ role
in climate mitigation (Gough 2013a).
4. Nation states of course also play important, unequal, and variable roles in shaping the
global governance of both climate-change policy and social policy. This whole issue
is left aside here, but is discussed and compared in Gough 2013c
5. For some of these ideas, see Victor 2008, Jackson 2009, Gough and Meadowcroft
2011, Gough 2013a, Coote 2013, 2015.
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